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BIANNUAL SURVEY
of express statutory authorization. This holding appears to conflict
with the express intent of the Revisers and the provisions of the
CPLR itself which, as already mentioned, sought to have the state
treated in the same way as any other litigant, absent express
provisions to the contrary. Since in the court of claims disclosure
is fully applicable against the state, why deny it against the state
or an agency of the state in the supreme court? If it is feared
that such disclosure would unreasonably burden the state, the
court could require that the disclosure may be had only on
order as is the practice in the court of claims. However, there
is no reason in logic or fairness to limit disclosure simply because
it is sought against the state or a state agency.
An avowed purpose of the CPLR was to ease crowded and
congested court calendars. The liberal use of disclosure devices
not only expedites trials; in many instances, such devices are
decisive in effecting a settlement of litigation out of court. It is
unfortunate that a barrier to this process has been erected by
the instant case. A construction of the CPLR which would
have allowed the disclosure against the state agency in the supreme
court would have more accurately reflected the aims of the
Revisers.16 7
Statement of defendant-driver given to defendant's insurer held
qualifiedly privileged against disclosure as "material prepared
for litigation."
Plaintiff in a personal injury action moved for discovery
of a statement made prior to the commencement of the action
by the defendant truck driver to the insurance carrier covering
defendants. Defendants resisted disclosure on the ground that
the statement was work product and further that no special
circumstances had been shown. The court held that the statement
constitutes material prepared for litigation and is therefore
qualifiedly privileged from disclosure under CPLR 3101(d).
In order to obtain its disclosure, plaintiff must show that the
report (used interchangeably with "statement") could not be
duplicated and that injustice or hardship would result from its
nondisclosure. The fact that plaintiff was five years of age at
the time of the accident and was unable to recall how it occurred
was not sufficient to compel disclosure in the absence of his showing
an inability to obtain the report through other methods of disclosure,
such as the taking of depositions188
107 See CPLR 104.1 Maiden v. Aid Carpet Serv., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 660, 251 N.Y.S.2d 987
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
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The difficulties in this area of disclosure stem from the
confusing criteria of CPLR 3101 (c) and (d). 69  While CPLR 3101
(d) gives "material prepared for litigation" a qualified privilege from
disclosure, CPLR 3101(c) establishes an absolute immunity from
disclosure for "attorney's work product." Recent cases have
presented conflicting views of the category into which accident
investigation reports fall.1 0  The court's decision in the instant
case may be helpful to resolve the confusion. The court took
the position that: "Whether an accident investigation is made
before or after litigation is begun and made by an attorney or a
layman, the report of the investigation is qualifiedly privileged
from disclosure as material prepared for litigation, unless prepared
primarily as an internal report in the regular course of the party's
business." 171
In so holding, the court appears to have carried out the
intent of the Revisers. In their discussion of accident investigations,
the Revisers did not classify accident reports as attorney's work
product or material prepared for litigation.1 7 2  A specific classi-
fication here was unimportant since whichever category they fell
into, the Revisers intended to give such reports a qualified
privilege. 7 3  What the Revisers did distinguish were those ac-
cident reports which were not to be privileged from disclosure
at all. Where the purpose of an accident report was to permit
effective managerial knowledge and control of a business, even
though the reports were also designed to provide information in
case of possible litigation, they are not given any protection from
disclosure. 7 4
'
69 The Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure originally proposed
a rule that would have given both attorney's work product and material pre-
pared for litigation a privilege from disclosure unless the court found that
withholding such matter would result in injustice or hardship. 1957 N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 6(b), FIRST PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COIMM~ITTEE
oN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 119 [hereinafter cited as FIRST REP.]. The
intent was to adopt the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court
in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court there held that the
work product of an attorney shall not be disclosed unless there be adequate
showing of good cause. However, when the CPLR was finally adopted, 3101 (d)
gave to material prepared for litigation the qualified privilege intended by the
Revisers while 3101(c) made the attorney's work product absolutely privileged
from disclosure. Hence the exemption afforded attorney's work product goes
beyond the Supreme Court's rule in Hickman v. Taylor and beyond the
Revisers' intent as expressed in the original draft.
170 See A Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
406, 435 (1964).
271 Maiden v. Aid Carpet Serv., Inc., supra note 168, at 662, 251 N.Y.S.2d
at 990.
17 2 FrasT REP. 120.
173 Ibid; see note 169 supra.




As pointed out in an earlier "Biannual Survey," 7 5 affording re-
ports of accident investigations a qualified privilege from dis-
closure makes for a just and logical rule. Most defendants who
are involved in accidents are covered by an insurance carrier.
Requisite to coverage is the cooperation of the insured, which
usually includes the submittal of accident reports. If the insured
knows that the report he files will carry a qualified immunity
from disclosure, he will not be reluctant to file a true report of the
accident.
Material prepared for litigation- test report by plaintiff's expert.
CPLR 3101(d) provides: "The following shall not be obtain-
able by disclosure unless the court finds that the material can no
longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and that
withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship: 1. any
opinion of an expert prepared for litigation . . . ." This section
adopts a modification of the rule laid down by the United States
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.17 6  That case held that
memoranda and statements compiled by counsel while preparing
his case are not absolutely privileged but require a showing. of
special circumstances before being obtainable. CPLR 3101(d) (1)
grants this qualified privilege to the reports of a party's experts
because experts work so closely with attorneys that their reports
often reflect the attorney's detailed tactical considerations. 7 7  The
privilege covers work done for purposes of litigation and not
routine reports made in the ordinary course of a business. 7
Renwal Prods., Inc. v. Kleen-Stik Prods., Inc.'79 was an
action based on defendant's shipment to plaintiff of allegedly de-
fective merchandise. Plaintiff sought discovery pursuant to CPLR
3120 indicating that it desired a materials consultant to perform
certain tests on goods in defendant's possession. Defendant moved
for a protective order under CPLR 3103 to allow the tests only
on the condition that plaintiff furnish defendant a copy of the
consultant's report. Plaintiff conceded defendant's right to be
present while the tests were made but refused defendant's demand
for a copy of the report. The court held that the expert's report
constituted "material prepared for litigation" under CPLR 3101
(d) (1). The report was deemed immune from discovery because
the plaintiff's testing would not have changed the condition of the
goods so as to prevent defendant from conducting its own tests.
275A Biannual Survey of New York Practice, supra note 170, at 436.
176329 U.S. 495 (1947).
'7 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3101, legislative studies 8.
278 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRx CIVI. PRACTICE 3101.52
(1964).
9~ 43 Misc. 2d 644, 251 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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